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that the public may have ready means of information as to the personal or financial responsibility behind the fictitious name.' 8 Some
state statutes provide that a partnership may not maintain an action
on a contract if it has not complied with the filing statute. 19 These
statutes do not apply to tort actions. 20 In some states there exist
statutes requiring that only trading partnerships shall record. 21 The
New York Legislature has exercised the widest power in requiring all
partnerships to file with the county clerk a certificate setting forth the
partnership
name and the names and addresses of all the individual
22
partners.
The legislature evidently found that the "fictitious name filing
statute" did not render sufficient protection to persons dealing with
partnerships since many partnerships have true names which are
incomplete designations. By requiring all partnerships to file an
opportunity is given to a person, contracting with the partnership, to
determine exactly with whom he is dealing. If one desires to bring
an ex delicto action against a trading or nontrading partnership, he
may sue the partners jointly or severally. 23 The filing statute protects this choice given the plaintiff by making it rather simple to determine who the partners are if the plaintiff wants to sue the partners
jointly. The statute is not unconstitutional as forbidding the transaction of busines. 24 It merely requires filing and provides a proper
penalty for any violation thereof. Although not a creature of the
state, as is a corporation, a partnership has become subject to much
state regulation in recent years in an effort to prevent any evils which
may arise *when two or more persons associate for the purpose of
transacting business.
CATHERINE GREENFIELD.

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE AND TRAINING ACT OF 1940.-Congress, exercising the power vested in it by the Federal Constitution,'
recently passed the first peacetime statute conscripting the nation's
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shall be necessary and proper for carrying- into execution the foregoing
powers").
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manpower for military training purposes. The likelihood of the Act
being declared unconstitutional is remote, for the spirit and aim of the
present legislation is similar to that of the 1917 Conscription Statute 2
which was upheld in the Selective Draft Cases. 3 It seems probable
that the 1940 measure will be viewed in substantially the same manner.
This question has already arisen in the lower courts. The constitu-4
tionality of the statute was upheld in United States v. Cornell,
wherein the court held that the instant legislation was within the
implied powers of Congress. In United States v. Rappaport5 defendant contended that the United States Supreme Court decisions
upholding the 1917 Statute as constitutional were not applicable in
construing the instant legislation, inasmuch as it was passed when the
country was not at war. The court rejected this contention, holding
that the Supreme Court in referring to the emergency then existing,
did not limit the exercise of the power only to a period in which the
country was at war.
The present statute is an attempt on the part of Congress to set
up a system for the training of the male citizenry of the nation so as
to provide the United States with a standing army and reserve force
adequate to meet any exigencies which may arise in the future. The
Act has as its avowed purpose, first, as declared in the preamble 6
"that in a free society the obligations and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair
and just system of selective compulsory military training and service",
and secondly, that this selection shall be so conducted as to disrupt in
as least a manner as possible the normal economic life of the nation
and the individuals affected thereby. The first requirement is that
those male citizens within the specified age limits must register at the
times set forth under the regulations of the Act.7 By this provision,
Congress is not merely supplied with data whereby it is enabled to
select those available for service, but a comprehensive census is thereby
made of the physical fitness and occupational skills of that part of the
population who, in time of war, bear the brunt of the military effort.
Selection of trainees is accomplished by the local boards who are of
necessity vested with a great amount of discretion. . Their determination as to occupational deferment and physial fitness is subject to
review by local appeal boards. As a final recourse an appeal may be
240 STAT.
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taken to the President.8 In view of the amount of discretion vested
in the local board it appears that the only co-ordinating factors are the
regulations promulgated by the President 9 and the rules and' instructions emanating from the director of Selective Service. Any registrant dissatisfied with his classification may apply to the appeal board
for reclassification, 10 but "he may not introduce any new evidence not
already contained in his file unless the board member or members
consent." 11 The registrant may appear in person before his local
board, but "no registrant -may be represented before the local board
by an attorney." 12 He has no right to appear either in person or
otherwise before the appeal board, nor may he introduce oral testimony or witnesses. 3 Inasmuch as the review of the appeal board is
thus limited, it is evident that as a practical matter the registrant must
depend upon the uniformity and fairness of his-local board rather than
the more nebulous protection of the appeal board. Failure to register,
report for induction upon notification, or to otherwise fail to comply
with the Act or interfere with its. operation subjects the individual to
criminal penalties ranging up to imprisonment for five years or fine of
$10,000 or both. 14 The present legislation, however, differs from the
1917 Statute in that the person failing to obey cannot be subject to the
rigors of military law until actually inducted into the armed forces. 15
At the completion of his training period, the individual must once
again relocate himself in some gainful occupation. The Act assists
him in this by providing that upon his discharge he shall, if his superiors see fit, be given a certificate attesting to his satisfactory completion of training and service. 6 Then, armed with this certificate and
if still qualified to perform the duties of his former position, he may
apply within forty days for reinstatement to the job which he held
before induction. 17 If the position was in the employ of a private
employer the latter must restore the individual to the said position or
to a position of like seniority, status and pay, unless his circumstances
have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable for him
to do so.' 8

The employee is to be considered as having been on"fur-

lough and is thereby entitled to such benefits, e.g., insurance, offered
by the employer as a part of his established rule or practice. 19 If the
employer refuses to re-employ or extend any benefit which his former
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9 § 10 (a) 1, 2.
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to it by the local board").
14 § II.
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employee is entitled to, the latter may request the United States District Attorney to petition the District Court of the United States for a
hearing. The court has the power to require the employer to reinstate
the employee and to compensate him for loss of wages suffered by the
employer's failure to comply with the mandate of the statute. 20 However, since the District Attorney need not appear for the employee
unless satisfied of the reasonableness of his claim, it would seem that
in the event assistance is there refused, he must engage an attorney at
his own expense and take solace in the knowledge that costs cannot be
imposed against him whether or not his petition is granted.
Assuming that the employer cannot reasonably reinstate the employee in his former position but has available a like or lesser position
for which the employee is qualified, the question arises as to whether
the court can order the employer to place the employee in the said
position. Probably the courts will not hesitate to declare themselves
possessed of discretionary power to so order the employer. The job
protection provisions of the Act will be extended to those men who
volunteer for training before being called for induction. 2 .
"Any person.. . who knowingly consuls, aids or abets another to
evade registration or service in the land or naval forces or any of the
requirements of this act, or of said rules, regulations and directions" 22
thereby commits a crime and is punishable in accordance with the
penal provisions of the statute. This section is undoubtedly necessary
to insure the efficient operation of the training program. It has been
stated by some that within the broadness of its language there may
exist a potential threat to the right of free speech. It has also been
urged that statements and expressions of opinion, otherwise freely
voiced in a democratic nation, may under the stress of war hysteria
and patriotic fervor be construed as violative of this section. The
judiciary should feel itself charged with the duty of preserving this
vital civil liberty by a fair and democratic interpretation of the clause
above quoted.
The Act appears adequate as a whole to perform its expressed
purpose of supplying the nation with a military force for national
defense. The regulations so far issued evidence the desire of those
charged with its administration to effect its operation in a manner
most harmonious with our democratic institutions and least disruptive
of the economic life of the individual. Members and students of the
legal profession, in particular, should take a keen interest in this legislation and its operation, inasmuch as it represents, to many, the keystone of our efforts to insure the perpetuation of a "government by
laws" and "not a government by men".
ALEXANDER VITALE.
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